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APPORTIONMENT OF INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
ASBESTOSIS CASES: COVERAGE, COVERAGE,
WHO'S GOT COVERAGE?
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread use of asbestos has resulted in the filing of
thousands of product liability suits by the victims of asbestos-related
diseases. This flood of asbestos cases may financially ruin asbestos-
product manufacturers and their insurers.' Asbestos-related diseases
have very long latency periods,2 which makes assignment of the dis-
ease to a specific insurer's coverage nearly impossible.
In order to determine which insurer must cover the claimant's
bodily injury, both insurers and manufacturers are bringing declara-
tory relief actions to clarify their rights and duties under their
insurance policies.' The critical problem in these proceedings is de-
termining when the claimant's bodily injury occurred, thereby trig-
gering insurance coverage. Of the few circuit courts of appeal ad-
dressing this issue, each has answered the "when" issue differently."
© 1987 by Leslie R. Lopez
1. In the past twenty years, more than 24,000 asbestos workers or their survivors have
filed lawsuits. L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 1. In 1984, The Jim Walter Corporation,
an asbestos-product manufacturer, faced 15,600 asbestos-related lawsuits. The Asbestos Alba-
tross, Forbes, Jan. 2, 1984, at 201. The Manville Corporation, another asbestos-product man-
ufacturer, filed for Chapter XI Bankruptcy because its estimated $2 billion litigation costs
would have exhausted its net worth. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6. As to the insurers,
one study estimates that by the end of this century, the total liability of the insurance industry
will be between $4 billion and $10 billion. P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCr, THE
ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 184 (1985).
2. The latency period of asbestosis has been estimated to range from 25-40 years. Mans-
field, Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860, 864 (1980); Selikoff,
Widening Perspectives of Occupational Lung Disease, 2 PREVENTIVE MED. 412 (1973). As-
bestos-related diseases, developing now, are the result of work conditions in the 1920's-1940's.
Id. at 430-31. In the year 2000, today's exposures will be reflected in disease development. Id.
3. Declaratory judgments are discussed infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. De-
fense and indemnification are discussed infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
4. In Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., which is discussed infra
notes 56-68 and accompanying text, the Sixth Circuit held that asbestosis occurred upon expo-
sure to asbestos hazards. 633 F.2d 1212, 1225-26 (6th Cir. 1980). In Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., discussed infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text, asbestosis was
found to have occurred when the fully manifested disease became capable of diagnosis. 682
F.2d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 1982). The D.C. Circuit, in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
which is discussed infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text, assumed that an occurrence of
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Currently, identical injuries covered by standardized insurance con-
tracts are treated differently under similar common law doctrines of
insurance and contract law.
This comment proposes a standardized approach to the equita-
ble apportionment of insurance coverage among the various insurers
of asbestos-product manufacturers. Section II describes how the cov-
erage conflict arises and the uncertainty that the asbestos decisions
have created. Section III identifies and analyzes the problems insur-
ers, insureds and claimants face in asbestos litigation. Finally, section
IV proposes a new test which synthesizes and augments two of the
leading asbestos cases to set a new, standardized and feasible ap-
proach for future asbestos litigation.
II. How ASBESTOS CONFLICTS ARISE
A. History of Asbestos Use
Asbestos' use has been widespread throughout this century.
With its great insulating properties, asbestos use became prevalent
because manufacturers found it to be an ideal material for use where
fire and excessive heat threatened the safety of their products." In
1935, commentators began calling attention to the carcinogenic
properties of asbestos.7 Although asbestos had long been suspected of
being hazardous, its relative indestructibility provided the rationale
for its continued use. Asbestos was most heavily used from 1940-
1960,' and is present in many forms today, typically in products
asbestosis begins with exposure and ends with manifestation of asbestosis. 667 F.2d 1034, 1047
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
5. Asbestos is derived from the Greek a, meaning "not," and sbestos, meaning "extin-
guishable." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 159 (2d unabr. ed. 1934). The
term asbestos refers to several types of fibrous materials that are mineral in nature. These
fibers may be spun or woven into cloth or sheets. The fibrous materials have the properties of
relative indestructibility and resistance to fire. Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16
FORUm 341, 342 (1980).
6. See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 861. The heat resistant properties and fibrous struc-
ture of asbestos make it extremely desirable as fireproofing and insulating material. Id. There
is no one material that can out-perform asbestos in such a wide range of applications, espe-
cially where high temperatures are involved. Id.
7. See Lynch & Smith, Pulmonary Asbestosis III: Carcinoma of the Lung in Asbestosis-
Silicosis, 24 AM. J. CANCER 56 (1935) (case report of carcinoma of the lung). Dr. D.C.
Cooper, an expert witness for asbestos-product manufacturers, testified that in the 1930's it
was known that inhaling asbestos dust caused asbestosis and that the danger could be con-
trolled by maintaining a modest level of exposure. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076, 1092-93 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). For a discussion
of asbestos and its effects on industrial workers, see Selikoff, Bader, Bader, Churg & Ham-
mond, Asbestosis and Neoplasia, 42 AM. J. MED. 487 (1967).
8. Asbestos use was mandatory in the Naval shipyards during World War 11. Military
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where fire and excessive heat are a safety threat.9 Thousands of
products in daily use throughout the world today, such as tooth-
brushes, ironing board covers, asphalt roofing shingles, and concrete
pipes, contain asbestos.10
The major diseases that result from exposure to asbestos dust
are mesothelioma and asbestosis." Mesothelioma is a neoplastic" tu-
mor arising from the mesothelial' surface lining. In short, mesothe-
lioma is a tumor of the membranes that line the internal body cavi-
ties. Asbestos is generally acknowledged to be the major cause of
mesothelioma, but it may not be the only cause. 4 A slight exposure
to asbestos may result in mesothelioma; however, because of its long
latency period, the exposure is often overlooked in a worker's
occupational history. 5 Asbestosis is the most common of the asbes-
tos-related diseases. Asbestosis is a pneumoconiosis"6 caused by in-
halation of asbestos fibers. The latency period of asbestosis may span
more than twenty-five years."7 It is estimated that there will be
twenty thousand asbestos-related deaths per year through the year
2000.'s
B. Asbestos Litigation
Many asbestosis victims have already sought legal redress for
their injuries. The typical underlying claim against an asbestos-
product manufacturer is one brought by an industrial worker who
was exposed to asbestos dust over a number of years. The long la-
specifications required asbestos in products sold to the government until 1976. Mansfield,
supra note 2, at 871.
9. Id. at 861.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 862. Pulmonary lung cancer and other carcinomas may also be causally re-
lated to asbestos exposure. Id.
12. An abnormal tissue that grows by cellular proliferation. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL Dic-
TIONARY, ILLUSTRATED 928 (23d ed. 1976) [hereinafter STEDMAN'S].
13. The mesothelial relates to the single layer of flattened cells forming an epithelium (a
cellular layer without blood vessels covering it), that lines the serous cavities (those which
produce or contain serum). Id. at 856.
14. See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 864.
15. Id. For purposes of this comment, the disease of asbestosis will be the central focus
of further discussions.
16. Pneumoconiosis is an inflammation commonly leading to fibrosis of the lungs due to
irritation caused by the inhalation of dust incident to various occupations. STEDMAN'S, Supra
note 12, at 1109.
17. Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation
Workers In the United States, 132 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCi. 139 (1965).
18. See Mehaffy, supra note 5, at 350. Although manufacturers have not used asbestos
for about 10 years, the problems will be with us for years to come. Id.
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tency period of asbestosis allows an exposed worker to remain
healthy throughout years of exposure to asbestos dust. Then, the
worker's health is slowly impaired by respiratory ailments. Once a
worker is diagnosed as having asbestosis, he is irreversibly sickened
by the slowly devastating disease.
In the landmark case of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products,19
several asbestos-product manufacturers were held strictly liable for
workers' asbestosis damages resulting from exposure to the manufac-
turers' asbestos-containing products.20 Clarence Borel, an industrial
insulation worker, was exposed to asbestos dust for thirty-three
years."' Although Borel thought that the asbestos dust may have
been bad for him, it was a common belief among Borel and his co-
workers that the dust would dissolve upon hitting their lungs. 2 '2 The
first time that Borel knew he had asbestosis was when his condition
was diagnosed in 1969." Borel died in 1970, and three years later
his family was awarded a total of $79,000 in damages.2 ' Borel
originally sought damages against eleven asbestos-product manufac-
turers, 2  and six of them were eventually held jointly and severally
liable for Borel's total damages.26
C. Comprehensive General Liability Policies
Once a manufacturer is alleged to be responsible for asbestosis
damages, it turns to its insurers for defense of the lawsuit and in-
19. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
20. 493 F.2d at 1103.
21. Id. at 1081. In 1936, Borel began working as an industrial insulator and was ex-
posed to the defendants' asbestos products throughout his career, which ended in 1969, when
Borel was disabled by asbestosis. Id.
22. Id. at 1082.
[W]e used to talk about . . . how bad was this dust, could it give you TB, could
it give you this, and everyone was saying, no that dust don't hurt you, it dis-
solves as it hits your lungs. . . . I knew I was working with insulation [and
that it contained asbestos], but I didn't know what asbestos was.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1082-83, 1102. The trial court determined that the total amount of damages
was $79,436. Four of the ten defendants had settled before trial, paying a total of $21,902.
The remaining six defendants were held jointly and severally liable for the balance of $58,534.
Id. at 1102.
25. Owens-Corning, Standard Asbestos Mfg., Unarco, Eagle-Picher, Combustion Engi-
neering, Fibreboard Paper Products, Johns-Manville, Pittsburgh Corning, Phillip Carey,
Armstrong Cork and Ruberoid were the eleven manufacturers. Id. at 1086, & n.17.
26. Borel argued.that the defendants' product was inherently dangerous, and, therefore,
the manufacturers should have given adequate warnings. Id. at 1086. The jury found six
defendants strictly liable. Of the other five defendants, four settled before trial and one received
a directed verdict. Id. at 1076.
[Vol. 27
19871 ASBESTOSIS AND INSURANCE
demnification of any damages awarded. Many times the manufac-
turer is covered by a type of insurance policy known as a Compre-
hensive General Liability policy (CGL). The standardized language
of CGL's provides coverage for all risks except those that are specifi-
cally excluded.27 Generally, CGL policies arrange for the insurer to
pay those sums that the insured manufacturer becomes legally obli-
gated to pay because of damages sustained and caused by an
occurrence.
2 8
Under one type of CGL, the occurrence policy, coverage is
broad enough to apply to both sudden accidents and injuries that
develop gradually. There is general agreement among the courts that
an occurrence need not be a sudden event, but may be a process.29
However, not all cases of gradual harm are covered since policy defi-
nitions may be varied, thereby allowing some insurers to provide
broader or narrower protection than other insurers.30 Thus, under
CGL's, there are many barriers to securing full protection against
claims brought by asbestosis victims since their injuries occur
gradually."
27. 2 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 11.01, at 11-2 (1986). Essen-
tially, CGL's provide that the insurer shall:
Pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury which is caused by an
occurrence. Bodily injury is an injury, sickness or disease which occurs during
the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom. An occur-
rence is an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions
which results in bodily injury, sickness or disease which occurs during the policy
period.
Mansfield, supra note 2, at 875.
28. CGL's generally cover "occurrences," not "accidents." Mansfield, supra note 2, at
875. Accident policies are, by their terms, more restrictive than occurrence policies. Because of
the long established definition of "accident" within the insurance industry, accident policies
cover only sudden, fortuitous events. Forest, Liability Insurance . . . Placement and Under-
writing, NAT'L INS. BUYER, Nov. 1959, at 10, 36. But see J. APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 4492 (Berdal ed. 1979). When used without restriction or qualification, the
word accident has been held to be broader than the restricted definition of a sudden, violent
event. Id.
29. See, e.g., Deodato v. Hartford Ins. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 396, 402, 363 A.2d 361,
365 (1966) (contractor's declaratory judgment action against insurer regarding duty to defend).
See also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Sam Harris Constr., 22 Cal. 3d 409, 583 P.2d 1335, 149
Cal. Rptr. 292 (1978) (aircraft liability insurer's declaratory relief action regarding the duty to
defend a negligent maintenance suit); California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins., 145 Cal.
App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983) (progressively worsening damage to property due to
seepage from swimming pool).
30. CGL's feature standardized language that is drafted by the National Bureau of Cas-
ualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau. See supra note 27. Individual
carriers may, however, vary this language to suit their needs. See Ingram, Insurance Coverage
Problems in Latent Injury Cases, 12 ENVTL. L. 317, 339 (1982).
31. See generally D. MACDONALD, CORPORATE RISK CONTROL 343-44 (1966); R.
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In addition, CGL policies provide that the insurer will pay all
sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as a result of
bodily injury caused by an occurrence."2 Bodily injury is defined
under CGL's as bodily injury, sickness or disease that occurs during
the policy period, and includes death at any time that results from
that bodily injury." An occurrence is defined as an accident, includ-
ing repeated exposure to conditions, that results in bodily injury. 4
The phrase "including injurious exposure to conditions resulting in
injury" eliminates the need to prove that the injury resulted from a
sudden event.85
1. The Insurer's Duty to Defend and Indemnify
Under a CGL policy, the insurer's duty to defend arises when
the asbestosis victim files a complaint asserting the asbestos-product
manufacturer is liable for injuries sustained. 6 The duty to defend is
much broader than the duty to indemnify 7 since a defense obligation
arises whenever the claimant's complaint alleges injuries within the
policy's coverage."8 It is the scope of the complaint, not the truth of
KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.4(c) (1971).
32. See supra note 27.
33. Id.
34. Id. The 1973 CGL policy further defined occurrence by including "injury [or) dam-
age neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." 2 R. LONG, supra note
27, § 11.01, at 11-6. By combining the CGL agreement with its definitions, a rather redun-
dant contractual agreement results:
The insurer will pay damages because of bodily injury which occurs during the
policy period, caused by continuous and repeated exposure to conditions which
result in bodily injury, sickness or disease which occurs during the policy period.
See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 875.
35. 2 R. LONG, supra note 27, § 11.06, at 11-40.
36. As a general rule, the allegations of the complaint are determinative of the insurer's
duty to defend. Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458, 465 (1952). See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65
Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966) (third party's complaint sufficiently
apprised insurer of its potential liability; therefore, insurer bears a defense duty); Previews,
Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1981) (California law requires only
that the complaint allege facts which give rise to potential liability under the policy to trigger
the insurer's duty to defend).
37. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 603 F.2d 780 (9th
Cir. 1979); Walters v. Marler, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1978). For a compre-
hensive discussion of the insurer's duty to defend, see Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend
Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 734 (1966).
38. See supra note 36. The result is that even if the insurer is certain no liability exists,
it must still defend the suit. This result occurs because CGL language provides that the in-
surer will defend any suit against the insured, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudu-
lent; but the insurer may make investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim. Essen-
tially, the insurer has made a trade-off between having full control of the defense, and
defending false claims. IA R. LONG, supra note 27, § 5.02, at 5-19, 5-30-5-35.
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its allegations, that gives rise to the insurer's duty to defend.8 9
Because of the various potential liabilities involved in asbestosis
cases, many asbestos insurers and insureds file declaratory relief ac-
tions4" to determine whether or not the insurer has a duty to defend
the insured in a given case.41 If the court finds that there is no obli-
gation to defend, the insurer avoids costly defense litigation. The
critical issue for resolution in these declaratory relief actions is
whether or not the asbestosis victim's injury falls within the insurer's
policy coverage.
39. IA R. LONG, supra note 27, § 5.02, at 5-29. See also California State Auto. Ass'n
Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Bourne, 162 Cal. App. 3d 89, 208 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1984) (the substance
of the pleadings measures the insurer's defense obligation); Karpe v. Great Am. Indem. Co.,
190 Cal. App. 2d 226, 11 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1961) (where allegations of the complaint show
potential liability within the policy's coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend).
In a multiple insurer situation, discussed infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text,
whether one of the carriers may discharge its defense obligation by paying out its policy limit
in settlement has not been clearly decided. R. LONG, supra note 27, § 5.25. Several courts
have reasoned that since the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify and the
indemnification language is contained in a separate clause, an insurer may not avoid its obliga-
tion to defend by paying out its policy limits in settlement. For example, several cases have
held that, to some extent, the insurer must defend even though indemnification coverage may
be exhausted. See, e.g., American Casualty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951);
American Casualty Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1950); and National Casualty Co.
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 230 F. Supp. 617 (D.C. Ohio 1964). See also Annot., 27
A.L.R.3d 1057, 1061-64 (1969).
On the other hand, several courts and commentators have found that, under current policy
language, the duty to defend ends when the policy's limits have been exhausted. Moreover, one
commentator has argued that it may be unethical for an insurer to continue defending upon
exhaustion of the policy limits because the insurer has no financial interest in the outcome.
Gowan, Provisions of Automobile and Liability Insurance Contracts, 30 INS. COUNS. J. 96,
9798 (1963). Professor Keeton suggests that placing the insurer in control of the litigation
after it no longer has a financial interest may be inconsistent with prohibitions against corpo-
rate practice of law. Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 13
VAND. L. REV. 837, 854 (1960). See also Denham v. LaSalle Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Under-
writers at Lloyds, London, 56 Cal. App. 3d 791, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1976).
40. A declaratory judgment declares the rights of the parties or expresses the court's
opinion on a question of law. See generally Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Holden, 166 F.
Supp. 684 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Ermolieff v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 19 Cal. 2d 543, 122 P.2d 3
(1942). See also CAL. CIv. PRoC. CODE § 1060 (Deering Supp. 1986) (any interested party
may bring an action for the declaration of his rights and duties including a determination of
any question of construction); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1983) (any court of the United States may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party).
41. A liability insurer may offer to defend subject to reservation of the right to disclaim
coverage or may file a declaration to test its duty to defend. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 508, 88 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1970). An insurer's declaratory
action to establish non-liability under a policy is one of the prime purposes of 28 U.S.C. §
2201. Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Teel, 391 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1968).
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2. Primary and Excess Insurers
A liability insurer may be either a primary or an excess carrier.
A primary carrier agrees that the limits of its policy shall be ex-
hausted first, and an excess insurer agrees to indemnify amounts
over that of the primary coverage.4 The insurer's purpose in includ-
ing an excess clause is to limit or eliminate that insurer's liability
because the insured has other coverage available."' Excess clauses
have proved to be highly disfavored since courts will, where possible,
construe policies to promote coverage.44 Therefore, unless the insurer
specifically states it is an excess carrier, the court will consider it a
primary insurer.45 If the coverage is excess, the excess carrier is not
obligated to contribute to a damages award or settlement until the
limits of the primary carrier's coverage have been exhausted."' The
primary and excess insurer distinction is important in situations
where the insured claims both primary and excess coverage. Since
many insureds purchase both layers of coverage over many years,
declaratory relief actions are then brought to determine the amount
of each carrier's liability.
Where both primary and excess policies are used in settling a
claim, several possibilities for apportionment of the liability exist.
First, where one carrier is clearly primary and the other is clearly
excess, the primary fund will be exhausted before the excess insurer
will be forced to contribute.4 Second, if both policies contain excess
clauses, the clauses will be disregarded as being mutually repugnant
42. Primary coverage is insurance coverage whereby, under the terms of the policy, lia-
bility attaches immediately upon the happening of the occurrence that gives rise to liability.
Olympic Ins. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 593, 597, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 908, 910 (1981). Excess insurance is coverage whereby, under the terms of the policy,
liability attaches only after a predetermined amount of primary coverage has been exhausted.
Id. at 598, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11.
43. Excess insurance is written with the expectation that the primary insurer will con-
duct the defense of all of the claims until its limits are exhausted. See Signal Co.'s, Inc. v.
Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 365, 612 P.2d 889, 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799, 803 (1980).
44. There are four general rules of insurance policy construction. First, the policy lan-
guage should be given its clear, literal and unambiguous meaning. Second, the meaning of
policy provisions can often be determined by the meaning the parties to the contract attach to
its terms and that meaning may be inferred from their conduct. Third, if a provision is ambig-
uous, it will be construed against the insurer, and in favor of the insured. Lastly, the reasona-
ble expectations of the insured should be honored. Ingram, supra note 30, at 342-44.
45. 1A R. LONG, supra note 27, § 5.24, at 5-166-5-167. See also Pacific Indem. Co. v.
Truck Ins. Exchange, 269 Cal. App. 2d 501, 74 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1969).
46. Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977); Nabisco, Inc. v. Trans-
port Indem. Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 831, 192 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1983).
47. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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thereby deeming both insurers to be primary carriers.48 Third,
where there are conflicting pro rata4 and excess clauses, the pro rata
clause is disregarded thereby making the policy primary, and the
excess clause is then given full effect.50 Finally, if an excess clause
conflicts with an escape clause,51 the general trend is to enforce the
escape policy as primary to the excess insurer."2
The question of when the asbestosis victim was injured is the
key to determining which insurers must defend and indemnify the
insured because the insurance carrier at the time of the claimant's
injury will be held responsible for those costs. The "when" question
is the most debated issue in recent asbestos litigation. Courts have
approached the "when" issue by applying one of three conflicting
theories to define what constitutes an occurrence. 58
48. Home Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 729 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.
1984) (mutually repugnant excess clauses disregarded and each insurer held liable for a pro
rata share of liability); Continental Ins. Co. v. Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy & Gardner, Inc.,
83 Cal. App. 3d 593, 148 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1978) (conflicting excess clauses cancel each other out
and the loss is prorated in proportion to coverage).
49. Pro rata clauses provide that if the insured has other insurance against the claimed
loss, the insurer shall not be liable for a greater proportion of the loss than the applicable
liability limit bears to the total liability limits of all insurance against the loss. 16 G. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 62:6 (2d ed. 1983). Thus if Insurer X carried a $100,000
CGL containing a pro rata clause, and Insurer Y carried a $50,000 CGL, the liability for a
$125,000 loss would be $83,750 indemnification from Insurer X and $41,250 from Insurer Y.
This result was reached as follows: Since Insurer X's liability cannot exceed the ratio of its
total liability coverage available ($100,000 to $150,000, or 67%), its total liability is 67% of the
$125,000 loss, or $83,750. This then leaves $41,250 to be indemnified by Insurer Y.
50. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Civil Serv. Employers' Ins. Co., 33 Cal. App.
3d 26, 108 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1973); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club of
S. Cal., 33 Cal. App. 3d 984, 109 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1973).
51. Escape clauses, also known as no liability clauses, provide that the policy is void if
there is another policy applicable to that loss. Continental Casualty Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co.,
134 Cal. App. 3d 389, 394, 184 Cal. Rptr. 583, 585 (1982). It is, however, well established
that no liability clauses are less favored under law than pro rata or excess clauses. Argonaut
Ins. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 6 Cal. 3d 496, 508, 492 P.2d 673, 680, 99 Cal. Rptr. 617,
624 (1972); Employer's Reins. v. Mission Equities Corp., 74 Cal. App. 3d 826, 831, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 727, 731 (1977).
52. Continental Casualty Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 134 Cal. App. 3d at 398, 184 Cal.
Rptr. at 586 (escape clause not to be given effect because excess insurers did not adequately
cover the insured); Home Indem. Co. v. Mission Ins. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 942, 961, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 544, 558 (1967) (public policy which strikes down escape clauses does not require excess
clauses to be stricken down).
53. After Borel allowed for recovery against asbestos-product manufacturers, several ap-
proaches have been urged for attaching insurance coverage to the manufacturers' damages pay-
ments. One approach, discussed infra text accompanying notes 54-77, attaches liability to the
carriers who provided coverage at the time of the claimant's initial exposure to asbestos
hazards. A second approach, which is discussed infra text accompanying notes 78-91, attaches
liability to the insurers providing coverage when the claimant's asbestos-related disease be-
comes manifest. A third theory, discussed infra text accompanying notes 92-108, holds the
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
D. The Conflicting Theories
1. The Exposure Theory
One of the three conflicting theories is the exposure theory
which assumes there is an occurrence when the claimant first comes
into contact with the asbestos hazards." ' The claimant's exposure
typically occurs at his place of employment where he is in frequent
contact with asbestos dust. Thus, under the exposure theory,
insurance coverage is triggered by the policy in effect during the
claimant's exposure to asbestos hazards, regardless of when the dis-
ease is subsequently diagnosed. 5 In Insurance Co. of North
America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.," the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that those insurers providing coverage at the time of
the claimant's exposure were liable for defense and indemnification
costs.57 The court of appeals in Forty-Eight upheld the district
court's adoption of a pro rata theory." Under the pro rata theory,
defense and indemnification costs are to be prorated among each of
the manufacturer's insurers providing coverage at the time of the
claimant's exposure. 9 Manufacturers who were uninsured during
periods in which a claimant was exposed to asbestos hazards are to
be included within the apportionment formula under this theory."
Therefore, if an asbestos-product manufacturer was uninsured for
ten of its fifty years of production, it would be liable for its pro rata
share, or one-fifth of the total liability.
Underlying the court's holding was the fact that Forty-Eight,
now uninsured, would have otherwise been unable to provide a
remedy for its claimants. Thus, the exposure theory was the most
appropriate solution under the circumstances."1 The court in Forty-
insurers providing coverage from exposure through manifestation liable for defense and indem-
nification costs.
54. Mansfield, supra note 2, at 876.
55. Some insurers argue that manifestation of asbestosis has nothing to do with when a
bodily injury occurred, and, therefore, those insurers providing coverage when the claimant's
disease is diagnosed are to be disregarded. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insula-
tions, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1217 (6th Cir. 1980).
56. 451 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mich. 1978), affd, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), reh'g
granted in part, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981).
57. Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1225-26. Forty-Eight was a declaratory relief action be-
tween the manufacturer, Forty-Eight Insulations, and several insurers. Since Forty-Eight in-
volved no asbestosis victims as parties, the court's decision concerns only the insurers' defense
and indemnification duties in future suits.
58. Id. at 1224.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1224-25.
61. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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Eight viewed the conduct of the insurer to be significant in determin-
ing liability as well. For example, prior to disclaiming its indemnifi-
cation and defense duties,"2 the Insurance Company of North
America (INA) considered exposure, not manifestation, to be the de-
termining factor for its defense and expense contributions. 3 More-
over in each of the last 150 asbestos lawsuits defended by INA with-
out objection or reservation, the claimant's manifestation date" ' came
after INA's coverage expired." Since the meaning of contract terms
may be inferred from a party's conduct, the court interpreted INA's
conduct regarding those lawsuits as inferring that its policies re-
quired application of the exposure theory." Additionally, the court
feared that Forty-Eight's insurance coverage would be rendered illu-
sory unless the court adopted the exposure theory," since Forty-
Eight would, in effect, be deprived of coverage it had previously paid
for, and would be unable to secure coverage in future cases. 8
One year after the Sixth Circuit decided Forty-Eight, the Fifth
Circuit, in Porter v. American Optical Corp.," followed the ration-
ale of Forty-Eight and held those insurers providing coverage at the
time of the claimant's initial exposure liable for the claimant's inju-
ries.7 Charles Porter brought suit for injuries resulting from his
twenty-five years of employment with National Gypsum.71 The de-
fendant, American Optical, was the manufacturer of a respirator and
filter, used by Porter during his employment, which were defectively
designed and therefore failed to protect Porter from asbestos
hazards.72 Consistent with the rationale in Forty-Eight, the Porter
court apportioned the insurance liability among those insurers who
provided coverage at the time Porter was exposed to the asbestos
62. In 1977, the Insurance Company of North America (INA) advised Forty-Eight of
its disclamation of all defense and indemnification duties with respect to any asbestos-caused
injuries which became manifest after October 31, 1972, the date INA's final policy expired.
Forty-Eight, 451 F. Supp. at 1236.
63. Id. at 1239.
64. The manifestation date is the date at which the claimant's asbestos-related diseasebecomes reasonably capable of being diagnosed. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
65. Forty-Eight, 451 F.Supp at 1239.
66. Id. "The meaning the parties themselves attach to the terms of the contract can be
inferred from their conduct." Id. See supra note 45.
67. 451 F. Supp. at 1240.
68. Id. "If the manifestation theory is adopted, Forty-Eight would be effectively de-prived of coverage it paid for and might be unable to secure coverage for liability in future
cases where manifestation occurs after coverage is not available." Id.
69. 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981).
70. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
71. 641 F.2d at 1130-31, 1133.
72. Id. at 1131, 1136-37.
1987]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
hazards." The key time period used for apportionment of defense
and indemnification costs in Porter was the entire twenty years of
Porter's exposure. 4
The Fifth Circuit did not set any guidelines for apportioning
the defense and indemnification costs75 other than fixing the relevant
time period to be used in apportionment as the years in which the
asbestosis victim was exposed to the asbestos hazards." Porter is
simply a reaffirmance of the exposure theory and its rationale. It did
not answer significant questions regarding apportionment of costs
between primary and excess insurers, nor did it give guidance as to
the effect of "other insurance" clauses which attempt to limit liabil-
ity, and may have been in the policies in question."
2. The Manifestation Theory
In contrast to the exposure theory, the manifestation theory
attaches liability to those insurers providing coverage when the
claimant's disease physically manifests, i.e. when the claimant knows
he is suffering from asbestosis or is diagnosed as having asbestosis.7 a
Consequently, the manifestation theory denies coverage during those
periods of asbestos exposure in which asbestosis was not
diagnosable.7
The leading case adopting the manifestation theory is Eagle-
Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.80 In
Eagle-Picher, the First Circuit held that the pertinent date for deter-
mining the insurer's liability is the date at which the asbestos-related
disease becomes reasonably capable of diagnosis.81 Eagle-Picher In-
73. Id. at 1145.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court realized that exact proration would be complicated by "other aspects
of the insurance policies." Id. The court, however, evaded prorating the exact amount of liabil-
ity by concluding that other CGL clauses, not in issue, may affect the proration. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 75.
78. Mansfield, supra note 2, at 876. Under the manifestation theory, coverage attaches
when the asbestos-related condition becomes known, should have become known, or is actually
diagnosed. Id.
79. Comment, Insurance Coverage of Asbestos Claims - Running for Cover or Cover-
age, 32 EMORY L.J. 901, 931 (1983). Since under the manifestation theory, liability attaches
upon diagnosis, coverage under periods of exposure to asbestos hazards is disregarded. See also
supra note 55.
80. 523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1981), modified on reh'g, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
81. 682 F.2d at 24-25. The court interpreted the policy language to require that expo-
sure result in injury that is reasonably capable of diagnosis, not that the injury be actually
diagnosed during the policy period. Id. at 24-25. On the other hand, the statute of limitations
is usually tolled until a plaintiff discovers his injury. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
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dustries had been mostly uninsured during the longest exposure peri-
ods, and the claims arising from periods in which Eagle-Picher was
insured were rapidly increasing.82 In 1978, Eagle-Picher sought de-
claratory relief to determine what obligation its various insurers had
to defend and indemnify in the 5000 asbestos cases pending against
Eagle-Picher.88 The district court held that manifestation of asbesto-
sis, and not exposure to asbestos hazards, equates with bodily
injury.84
The court based its reasoning upon medical evidence and basic
tenets of insurance law.85 Medical evidence produced at trial showed
that, in most instances initial exposure may not lead to asbestosis.8
To produce asbestosis, a substantial amount of exposure over a
lengthy period of time is required."' The court in Eagle-Picher ap-
plied the general rule of insurance law, that unambiguous contract
terms be given their ordinary meaning, to the policy terms "bodily
injury, sickness and disease."'88 The district court's result was that
the manifestation theory should apply because the underlying claims
were based, not on a process of exposure, but on fully manifested
asbestosis. 8' On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed, stating, first, that
application of the manifestation theory was required because the
policies in effect clearly distinguished between exposure and the re-
sulting injury or disease; and, second, that the common meaning of
the policy language supported the manifestation theory."0
82. 682 F.2d at 23. Eagle-Picher was uninsured prior to 1968, the period of greatest
exposure. Id. Eagle-Picher purchased CGL coverage in 1968, and continued to purchase it in
increasing amounts through the 1970's even though it stopped producing asbestos-containing
products in 1971 or 1972. Id.
83. 523 F. Supp. at 111.
84. Id. at 115.
85. Id. at 115-16.
86. A medical expert testified that 90% of all urban city dwellers have some asbestos-
related scarring, but only a tiny percentage of those exposed will ever develop asbestosis. Id.
87. The effects of excessive inhalation of asbestos dust are both time and dose related.
Therefore, there may be levels of exposure that will not result in any increased risk of disease.
Mansfield, supra note 2, at 861.
88. 523 F. Supp. at 115-16.
89. Id. at 116. The manifestation proponents argue that all of the underlying claims
against Eagle-Picher alleged fully manifested asbestosis, not subclinical cellular injuries. The
court saw the layperson's understanding of asbestosis to be a symptomatic, diagnosable disease.
Id.
90. 682 F.2d at 19. The court used Webster's Dictionary to define "injury" as hurt ordamage sustained, and thereby concluded that asbestosis results when one has symptoms that
impair their sense of well-being, or when a doctor could make a prognosis that manifestation is
inevitable. Id.
The court also discussed the fact that other asbestos-related diseases, e.g., mesothelioma,
are apparently not cumulative like asbestosis; therefore, given the desirability to similarly treat
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The fact that Eagle-Picher was, for the most part, uninsured
during the heaviest periods of exposure" was a major factor in the
court's reasoning since public policy urges coverage of the insured in
order to compensate the victims of asbestos-related diseases. If the
exposure theory had been applied, Eagle-Picher would not have
been able to pay the thousands of uninsured claims brought against
it. The court in Eagle-Picher was forced to choose between applying
the manifestation theory which would allow recovery by asbestosis
victims, or applying the exposure theory which would have left
thousands of victims without a remedy.
3. The Exposure In Residence Theory
The exposure in residence theory is a hybrid of the exposure
and manifestation theories. Under the exposure in residence theory,
each insurer, from the period of initial exposure through manifesta-
tion, is required to indemnify and defend the insured."2
Adopting the exposure in residence theory, the Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit, in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of
North America,98 relied upon the expectations of the insurer and the
insured to arrive at a contract interpretation which would be equita-
ble, feasible and consistent with contract principles.' 4 The exposure
in residence theory assumes that an occurrence of asbestosis involves
an injurious process that begins with exposure and ends with
manifestation." Following this rationale, Keene held each insurer
providing coverage from the time of initial exposure through mani-
festation liable for the insured's defense and indemnification costs."
Writing for the majority, Judge Bazelon reasoned that the exposure
theory would characterize the subsequent development of disease as
a consequence of the original exposure, thereby denying additional
all asbestos-related diseases, the manifestation theory is "more compatible with the medical
evidence and the policy language." Id. at 19 n.3.
91. The court noted that unlike Eagle-Picher, Forty-Eight, to whom the exposure the-
ory applied, carried insurance during a substantial period of exposure to its products. Id. at 23
n.9.
92. Obremski, "Toxic Tort" Litigation and the Insurance Coverage Controversy, 34
FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q. 3, 20 (1983) (called the "continuous trigger" theory by the author).
93. 513 F. Supp. 47 (D.D.C.), affid, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1007 (1982).
94. 667 F.2d at 1041.
95. Id. at 1047.
96. Id. At the time, Keene had been named as a co-defendant in over 6,000 lawsuits
that alleged injury caused by exposure to its asbestos products. Id. at 1038.
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coverage for the resultant disease.97 In effect, the exposure theory
was thought to undermine the certainty which is reasonably expected
from insurance agreements. Under the exposure theory, the insured
would be held liable for those latent asbestos injuries whose develop-
ment began with exposure prior to the policy period, whereas the
insured would not be liable, under identical facts, if the manifesta-
tion theory were applied."
The court in Keene saw this discrepancy between the exposure
and manifestation theories as an unfair, "either-or" approach."
Accordingly, the court concluded that asbestos-related diseases con-
tinually trigger coverage under CGL's. Thus, pursuant to the Keene
rationale, each stage of asbestosis development triggers coverage
under a CGL: the initial exposure, exposure in residence (disease
development), and manifestation.' 0 In sum, bodily injury was inter-
preted by the Keene court to mean any part of the single injurious
process from which asbestos-related diseases develop.' 0'
The Keene court rejected application of a pro rata approach to
defense and indemnification costs,'02 and instead held each insurer
liable for the entire amount of liability.' 03 The insured, Keene, was
not allowed to "stack" the liability limits of the applicable policies. 04
Rather, Keene was told to select the one policy under which it was
to be indemnified.' 5 Pursuant to Keene, after the insured chooses
the applicable policy, that insurer may require indemnifications from
the other insurers in proportion to their liabilities, subject to the
97. Id. at 1044.
98. A manufacturer who purchased CGL coverage would not bear the risk of liability
for diseases that occurred due to exposure during the covered period. It would, however, bear
the risk for diseases that manifest themselves during the covered period, but occurred due to
exposure during an uninsured period. Id.
99. Obremski, supra note 92, at 19.
100. 667 F.2d at 1047.
101. Id.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. The Keene Corporation's insurer argued
that Keene should bear its pro rata share of liability costs for periods of exposure during which
Keene was uninsured. The insurer based its argument on its characterization of asbestos-re-
lated diseases as constituting a multitude of discrete injuries. Because the court declined to rely
on that characterization to determine when coverage is triggered, it also declined to rely on it
to determine the extent of coverage. 667 F.2d at 1047.
103. 667 F.2d at 1047.
104. The term "stacking" refers to a recovery under more than one policy by placing
one policy upon another and recovering from each until either all of the damages are satisfied
or the limits of all of the policies are exhausted. Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 98
N.M. 166, 646 P.2d 1230 (1982). Therefore, if Keene were allowed to stack its liability limits,
it would have been entitled to full indemnity for each injury up to the sum of the limits
provided by the applicable policies.
105. 667 F.2d at 1049-50.
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"other insurance" clauses in the policies. 06 This in effect, places the
burden upon insurers to either determine apportionment of coverage
consensually among themselves or adjudicate the issue in a subse-
quent lawsuit. 107 Under the Keene approach, where a manufacturer
was uninsured during some periods of exposure, that manufacturer
may escape its pro rata share of the total liability for periods of ex-
posure in which it was uninsured since the total liability is placed
with the one insurer that the manufacturer selected. 08
E. No Clear Path Has Been Set For Future Litigation
The cases discussed above are examples from the few jurisdic-
tions that have answered the question of which insurer is obligated
to defend and indemnify asbestos claims brought against the manu-
facturer insureds.1 9 However, none of these cases have shown a
preference for any single theory. Unless a uniform theory is promul-
gated, there are a number of possible outcomes for future asbestosis
cases. Recent federal and California cases illustrate the problems
created by the conflicting judicial rationales adopted by various
courts deciding insurance apportionment cases.
Applying California law, a recent Ninth Circuit case, Hancock
Laboratories v. Admiral Insurance Co., 10 rejected application of
both the Keene and Eagle-Picher theories in favor of applying Forty-
Eight's exposure theory."' Hancock was a declaratory relief action
106. Id. at 1050. "Other insurance" clauses, such as excess, pro rata and escape clauses,
provide for the insurer's share of liability when there are other policies that apply to the same
loss. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
107. 667 F.2d at 1051.
108. See id. at 1048-50. It is, however, unclear under Keene whether the insurer may
seek indemnification from the manufacturer as a self-insured in subsequent litigation among
insurers with regard to apportionment.
109. Forty-Eight was decided in the Sixth Circuit; Porter, in the Fifth Circuit; Eagle-
Picher was decided in the First Circuit; and Keene is a District of Columbia Circuit case.
To date, there are no other circuit court of appeals cases or state supreme court cases on
this issue which hold Forty-Eight as controlling. As to the manifestation theory, Ohio has
adopted the manifestation theory only as to when a claimant's cause of action arises for statute
of limitations purposes, not insurer liability. O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St. 3d 84,
447 N.E.2d 727 (1983). The Third Circuit follows Keene. ACandS Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1985) (commercial insulator's declaratory relief action against
all liability insurers). The California Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue
specifically.
110. 777 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1985) (interpreting California law).
111. Id. at 525. Judge Reed, writing for the court, noted that the California Supreme
Court had not yet decided this issue, and then went on to find that, under the circumstances, it
was "probable that the California Supreme Court would find the reasoning and results of...
Forty-Eight to be correct." Id. Another Ninth Circuit case, Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Black,
717 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1983), applied the manifestation theory to an asbestos case. Todd
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between Hancock and its insurers with respect to a case involving a
progressive injury due to the implantation of a contaminated porcine
aortic valve."1 Although the Hancock court looked to Forty-Eight,
Eagle-Picher and Keene, the leading asbestosis cases, the type of in-
jury presented to the Ninth Circuit was not substantially similar to
those found in asbestosis cases. It was relatively simple for the
Hancock court to determine that bodily injury took place upon im-
plantation of the contaminated valve. As the court pointed out, only
six months had elapsed between the injured party's exposure and
manifestation of his injury, 1 8 whereas asbestosis does not develop for
many years.1 1' Thus, the Hancock court also declined to follow a
recent California appellate court decision that discussed insurance
coverage apportionment. 1
In an earlier California court of appeal case, California Union
Insurance Co. v. Landmark Insurance Co.," 6 two liability insurers
sought declaratory relief to determine their respective liabilities for
property damage that took place over a sixteen month period.117 In
June 1979, a swimming pool was built on the subject property."'
Later, it was discovered that the pipes to the swimming pool, and
possibly the pool itself, leaked, causing progressive saturation result-
ing in the damage. 9 The insurers both agreed that all of the
damage, from July 1979 through November 1980, was caused by the
swimming pool. 20 California Union Insurance Company, as the
successor insurer, filed a declaratory relief action' asking for a de-
Shipyards, however, was decided pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (The Longshoreman's &
Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA)) which requires application of the manifesta-
tion theory. 717 F.2d at 1286. Pursuant to the LHWCA's "last covered employer rule" the
last employer covered by the LHWCA who causes or contributes to an occupational injury is
completely liable for the injury even if the employee incurred the injury, in part, while subse-
quently working for an employer who is not covered by the Act. Id. at 1287.
112. A porcine aortic valve is taken from a pig's heart, sterilized and placed in humans
as a replacement valve in the aorta. 777 F.2d at 521 n.2. See also STEDMAN'S, supra note 12,
at 1280, 114, 1734.
113. The porcine valve was implanted on December 15, 1976, and the contaminated
valve had to be replaced six months later. 777 F.2d at 521-22.
114. See supra note 2.
115. 777 F.2d at 525 n.10. The circuit court did not feel bound by the California appel-
late cases because, inter alia, the circuit court is not bound by California court of appeal cases
and the court viewed the appellate cases as applying the law incorrectly. Id.
116. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
117. Id. at 464-67, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 461-64.
118. Id. at 466, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 462-63.
119. Id. at 466, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
120. Id. at 467, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
121. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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termination of its liability under a CGL with respect to the earlier
insurer, Landmark Insurance Company."'
The court discussed the similarities between asbestosis cases and
the present situation involving gradual harm. 2 The main similarity
was found to be the fact that the CGL's were being applied to single
accident/occurrence, continuing damage claims.1 2 4 Citing Forty-
Eight and Keene with approval, the court combined the rationales of
the two cases in order to apportion the liability of the two insur-
ers,1 25 noting that in cumulative injury cases apportionment has long
been the rule in California. 12  The combination resulted in a varia-
tion of the Keene and Forty-Eight approaches, which the court ap-
plied to find both insurers liable for the full amount of the
damages.1 27
Hancock and California Union are current examples of the in-
consistent application of apportionment theories under identical legal
principles. Given this inconsistency, each court is, apparently, free to
apply any theory of liability apportionment to CGL insurers. Future
courts considering this issue must choose a test to be applied. Each of
the conflicting tests has its strengths and weaknesses, proponents and
opponents.
III. EXAMINATION OF THE CONFLICTING THEORIES
Generally, manufacturers approve of the exposure theory and
insurers disapprove of it.128 Insurers consider the exposure theory to
be unfair because the theory binds them to policies that expired long
ago and are considered closed by the insurer.' 2 Manufacturers, on
the other hand, approve of the exposure theory because, as a result
of spreading losses back over numerous years of coverage, the manu-
facturer will not be faced with increased liability costs.""
122. 145 Cal. App. 3d at 468, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
123. Id. at 477-78, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
124. Id. at 478, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
125. Id. at 478, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 470-71.
126. Id. at 478, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 471. See generally City of Torrance v. Workers'
Comp. Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. 3d 371, 650 P.2d 1162, 185 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1982) (employee's
compensation award for cumulative injury apportioned between successive insurers); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 5500.5 (Deering Supp. 1986) (apportionment of employer's liability for occupa-
tional disease or cumulative injury).
127. 145 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
128. See Mansfield, supra note 2, at 860, 876-77.
129. See Comment, supra note 79, at 931. A rule of law that binds a carrier to a policy
that expired many years ago and is actuarially unrealistic is unfair. Id.
130. Mansfield, supra note 2, at 877. The general economic effect of the exposure the-
ory is to spread losses back over numerous years of primary coverage. Id.
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Commentators have used policy arguments to both support and
oppose adoption of the exposure theory. Some assert that liability
placed upon early insurers may make it more likely that the poten-
tial harm may be discovered earlier, and therefore the public could
be warned earlier. " ' A similar argument insists that application of
the exposure theory will help minimize accident costs by placing the
burden upon manufacturers, the parties best able to evaluate the
risks of hazardous activities. " 2 Moreover, the increased CGL premi-
ums that would follow will give manufacturers an incentive to
maintain safer workplaces. "
On the other hand, there are competing policy interests with
respect to those insurers who are held liable under the exposure the-
ory. For instance, it may be unfair to hold insurers liable under poli-
cies that were extinguished many years before the claimant's loss,
and are now considered obsolete by the insurer. By looking back to
the time the claimant was exposed to asbestos hazards, the exposure
theory may "resurrect claims that the insurer wrote-off many years
ago."13 4 Moreover, where a manufacturer was insured only during
the early periods of production, the insurer would have to bear the
burden of indemnifying a claim at today's prices, that is based on a
policy generated decades ago." Coverage paid on a claim based on
today's figures which arose under a forty-year-old premium would
be so disproportionate and unpredictable that many insurers may be
financially ruined.
The manifestation theory is not as strongly supported by public
policy as is the exposure theory because its application may discour-
age insurers from underwriting these types of policies. "' If the
manifestation theory were applied, few insurers would contract to
protect a company that had exposed thousands of workers to asbestos
hazards which are now manifesting. The courts, in interpreting
CGL's, prefer to spread losses in a manner that results in fairness to
all concerned parties; " 7 therefore, the manifestation theory of liabil-
ity will most often be rejected in favor of another theory.
131. Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1231 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
132. 26 VILL. L. REV. 1080, 1099 (1981).
133. Id.
134. Comment, supra note 79, at 931.
135. Id.
136. Id. An insurer might escape liability by cancelling or declining to renew coverage
before manifestation results. Id.
137. It is a paramount principle of insurance policy construction that a policy should be
interpreted to give effect to the intent of the parties. Price v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., Ltd.,
616 F.2d 422, 427 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Uniform adoption of either the exposure or manifestation the-
ory is unlikely since both suffer from too many internal flaws. For
example, where a manufacturer was insured twenty to forty years
ago, but is presently uninsured, an asbestosis victim will have a com-
plete remedy under the exposure theory, but no remedy whatsoever
under the manifestation theory. Where the exposure theory is ap-
plied, the long latency period of asbestosis places a huge burden on
insurers to defend and indemnify policies that, in all reasonableness,
should be considered obsolete. The manifestation theory stands to be
the least equitable solution since most manufacturers, now unin-
sured, would leave thousands of claimants completely without a
remedy. 188 While application of the exposure and manifestation the-
ories were required in their individual settings to provide coverage
for the insured and redress for the asbestosis victim, they are prime
examples of the maxim, "hard cases make bad law," and should not
be applied to future asbestosis cases.
Although common law principles of insurance and contract law
are similar throughout the states, and CGL's incorporate standard-
ized terms in an attempt to reduce litigation regarding those terms,
similar claims under similar policies interpreted under similar law
have resulted in an array of resolutions. All concerned parties, the
asbestosis victim, the insured manufacturer, and the insurer, are sub-
ject to protracted and expensive litigation to determine their rights
and duties before any type of settlement can be reached.' 9 Money
that could be available for the asbestosis victim is spent on deciding
who is to ultimately pay for the victim's harm.
Although each major asbestosis case has set forth an entirely
different approach, the United States Supreme Court has not agreed
to hear arguments on this issue. " ° With different jurisdictions ap-
plying different standards for apportioning liability, insurers and
insureds can anticipate nothing more than different standards ap-
plied to identical issues. Presently, trial court judges are forcing set-
tlements between asbestosis victims and manufacturers in an attempt
138. In the mid-1970's, the insurance industry changed its policies which, in effect, left
most asbestos-product manufacturers unable to obtain insurance, and brought about an end to
adequate coverage of asbestosis victims. See Comment, supra note 79, at 912 n.12.
139. See also infra note 142. The Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice re-
leased a study that shows asbestos victims have received $236 million in compensation, their
lawyers have received $164 million, and defense attorneys earned $600 million. L.A. Times,
Feb. 13, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
140. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to Keene and its four insurers. 455 U.S. at
1007.
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to reduce the huge backlog of asbestos cases.141 Those asbestosis vic-
tims who are willing to go to trial have no way of predicting whether
a judgment in their favor will lead to payment on their claim.14 2
This uncertainty throughout the country may lead insurers, insureds
and claimants to forum shop for a favorable outcome. 148 Until the
courts adopt a more standardized approach, the only certainty in as-
bestos litigation is uncertainty.
IV. AN EQUITABLE AND FEASIBLE APPORTIONMENT THEORY
FOR FUTURE ASBESTOSIS CASES - THE COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH
The most practical solution to this asbestos litigation problem is
to adopt a comprehensive approach for apportionment. This ap-
proach involves an expansion of the Keene court's exposure in
residence theory1 44 for determining which insurers are liable for con-
tribution, and to incorporate the Forty-Eight court's pro rata theory
which apportions that liability among the insurers.14 Although each
of the three approaches set forth by the circuit courts have serious
failings,1" the Keene approach can be modified to best protect the
intent and interests of all parties.
The court in Keene held that the limits of one CGL policy sub-
ject to "other insurance" provisions would apply to each injury. 47
141. One of the consequences of the asbestos litigation flood is the attempt by judges to
dispose of the huge backlog of claims by forcing settlements. Winter, The Asbestos Legal Tidal
Wave Is Closing In, 68 A.B.A. J. 397 (1982). Judges have openly admitted that because of the
growing backlog, they impose stringent pretrial orders and otherwise pressure asbestos lawyers
in an attempt to expedite litigation. Id.
142. In the past 20 years, 24,000 asbestos workers have filed lawsuits but only 4,000
have received compensation. L.A. Times, supra note 139, at 3, col. 1. Of the S1 billion that
asbestos-product manufacturers and their insurers have spent in compensation and legal ex-
penses, asbestos victims have received only 37 cents of every dollar. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1984,
at A18, col. 2.
143. The Supreme Court's denial of insurers' appeals has been characterized as forcing
"state-by-state" asbestos battles between insurers and insureds. N.Y. Times, March 9, 1982, at
D7, col. 1. One result of the state-by-state battle could be that decisions from different jurisdic-
tions will vary because of their divergent interpretations of insurance and contract law. Id.
144. See supra text accompanying note 92.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
146. The exposure theory will bar recovery from asbestos-product manufacturers where
the victim's disease manifests after the manufacturer is uninsured. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text. On the other hand, the manifestation theory would bar recovery where the
victim's disease became capable of diagnosis but the manufacturer was uninsured. See supra
note 79 and accompanying text. The inconsistency in the exposure in residence theory is that it
allows uninsured manufacturers to escape their pro rata share of liability. See supra text ac-
companying note 108.
147. 667 F.2d at 1049-50.
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The time of the injury was determined to be a process that occurs
throughout the periods of initial exposure, exposure in residence,
and manifestation of asbestosis."' 8 The Keene case takes into consid-
eration the lengthy latency period of asbestosis and the underlying
policy that encourages recovery for the asbestosis victim. By taking
into account the protracted latency period of asbestosis that can span
several coverage periods, Keene allows for a recovery that is the most
equitable of all the asbestos decisions to date.
However, the Keene case has inconsistencies which, if left in-
tact, will not help resolve asbestos litigation problems. First, Keene
failed to set an adequate apportionment formula. The court in Keene
found all of the insurers throughout the injurious process to be fully
liable for defense and indemnification costs. 14 9 Not all of the insurers
contribute to the defense and indemnification costs however, since the
insured picks one policy to apply to that claim.'5 The second flaw in
Keene is that the court allowed the Keene Corporation to escape lia-
bility for periods in which it was uninsured by holding that "each
policy provides Keene with the right to be free of liability. .. .
This proves to both be unfair to insurers and to provide a further
incentive for insurers to refuse all future coverage to manufacturers.
The manufacturer should not expect future insurance carriers to de-
fend and indemnify it for those periods in which it was uninsured.1
52
The apportionment formula that would be the most fair to all
parties is the pro rata method used in Forty-Eight.5 Under a com-
bination of Keene and Forty-Eight, defense and indemnification costs
would be apportioned among all insurers providing coverage during
the entire injurious process of the claimant's disease. In keeping with
Keene, the "other insurance," excess insurance, and all other CGL
clauses affecting the insurer's duty to defend and indemnify are to be
taken into account when apportioning costs. In apportioning costs, a
manufacturer who was uninsured during part of the injurious
process will bear its share of the costs. Inclusion of uninsured manu-
148. Id. at 1047.
149. Id. at 1048-49.
150. Id. at 1049.
151. Id. at 1048. Nothing in CGLs provide for a reduction in the insurer's liability if
the injury occurs while Keene was uninsured. Id. at 1048-49. "Even if we had the authority
[to consider Keene self-insured], what would we pretend that the policy provides? What would
its limits be? There are no self-insurance policies .. " Id.
152. However, in more recent years where insurers have completely stopped insuring
asbestos-product manufacturers, public policy may urge the courts to allow the uninsured
manufacturer to avoid inclusion in liability apportionment.
153. 633 F.2d at 1224. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
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facturers into the apportionment formula is the most equitable solu-
tion for the insurers, manufacturers and claimants. This proposed
comprehensive approach is a much more flexible and applicable test
than those previously used. This approach will not result in an all or
nothing application of a theory. Rather, this approach will spread
losses equitably and practicably among all carriers, apportioning the
total loss throughout the injurious process of asbestosis development.
To illustrate application of this proposed approach, the follow-
ing hypothetical situation will be used. Manufacturer X produced
asbestos-containing products from 1930 through 1980. An employee
of Manufacturer X was exposed to asbestos hazards for twenty
years. In the employee's suit against Manufacturer X, the defense
costs and damages award totals $1,500,000. Manufacturer X has
now turned to his insurance carriers for defense and indemnification.
Throughout the fifty years that Manufacturer X was producing
asbestos-containing products, four insurance carriers provided cover-
age, and, for five of those fifty years, Manufacturer X was
uninsured. The following table shows the insurers, their policy peri-
ods, applicable "other insurance" clauses, and the policy limits.
"Other Insurance" Policy
Carrier Policy Period Clauses Limits
Insurer A 1935-1950 Primary Insurance $500,000
Insurer B 1956-1970 Pro Rata Clause $500,000
Insurer C 1961-1970 Excess Insurance $500,000
Insurer D 1966-1975 Escape Clause $500,000
First, there is some coverage overlap due to the varying policy
periods. To manage this overlap, the total period of the worker's
exposure to asbestos hazards (20 years) may be divided equally into
four 5 year segments.'" The total liability is then divided among
those segments, resulting in a total liability for each 5 year segment
of $375,000. Next, the liability is apportioned among the carriers
based upon the respective length of their policy periods and the effect
of the applicable "other insurance" clauses. The total liability for
defense and indemnification costs is to be apportioned as follows: No
contribution from Insurer A; $500,000 contribution from Insurer B;
154. Here, for purposes of simplicity, the hypothetical has been designed to be divisible
into four equal segments. In other situations, the apportionment may require division on a
different basis, most likely yearly. For example, instead of dividing the total liability of
$1,500,000 into four segments of $375,000, it may be divided yearly, throughout the twenty
years of exposure, into segments of $75,000 each.
1987]
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$250,000 contribution from Insurer C; $375,000 from Insurer D;
and $375,000 contribution from Manufacturer X. The following ta-
ble shows the resultant apportionment.
Carriers Providing Cover- Amount of
Time Period age During This Period Liability
1951-1955 Uninsured $375,000*
1956-1960 Insurer B $375,000
1961-1965 Insurer B $125,000
$250,000
1966-1970 Insurer B None
Insurer C None
Insurer D $375,000
*This amount is to be paid by Manufacturer X since it was
uninsured for one-fourth of the total expospre period.
Since Insurer A did not provide coverage during any of the
twenty years of the employee's exposure it has no liability, and thus
is not required to contribute to the defense and indemnification costs.
Next, since Manufacturer X was uninsured for the years 1951-55,
or one-fourth of the employee's exposure period, it must bear its pro
rata share of the costs which equals $375,000. As to the 1956-60
period, Insurer B was the only carrier providing coverage, thus, it is
fully liable for that period. As to the 1961-65 period, there are two
carriers, Insurer B and Insurer C, who must contribute. Since In-
surer B's pro rata clause conflicts with Insurer C's excess clause, the
pro rata clause is to be disregarded, thereby making Insurer B's pol-
icy primary and giving full effect to Insurer C's excess clause.155
Therefore, Insurer B will be liable up to its policy limit of $500,000.
Insurer B, however, is already responsible for $375,000 from the
1956-60 period, thereby leaving Insurer B a balance of $125,000 of
primary coverage responsibilities from the 1961-65 period. The re-
maining $250,000 from the 1961-65 period will be paid by the
excess carrier, Insurer C. With respect to the 1966-70 period, In-
surer D must indemnify the $375,000 liability. This is because In-
surer D's escape clause conflicts with Insurer C's excess clause, and,
following the general trend, Insurer D's escape policy will be en-
forced as primary to Insurer C's excess policy.15 Since Insurer D is
then deemed the primary carrier for this period, the entire costs for
155. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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that period, $375,000, will be paid under the obligations of its
policy.
As the hypothetical shows, the comprehensive approach is both
equitable and feasible. Here, Insurer A did not provide coverage
during the relevant time period, and thus, is not liable for any of the
defense and indemnification costs. Insurer B, however, provided the
longest period of coverage, and is considered a primary carrier.
Thus, in all fairness, Insurer B carries the heaviest burden. Insurer
C, having included a valid excess clause, carries the least responsibil-
ity for defense and indemnification costs, and Insurer D carries its
fair share as a primary carrier. Furthermore, Manufacturer X, be-
ing uninsured for one-fourth of the claimant's total exposure period,
must contribute its pro rata share of the costs. As illustrated above,
this comprehensive approach can and should be utilized in future
cases.
This comprehensive approach to apportionment, although new
to the area of asbestos litigation, does not urge the California courts
to take a radical step by adopting it. Rather, this approach, in sub-
stantially similar form, has already been applied in other contexts.
The California Supreme Court, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,15 7
adopted what is commonly referred to as the "enterprise and market
share" theory of liability. The court, in adopting this theory, im-
posed liability on each of eleven manufacturers of the drug DES,
who were joined in the lawsuit, for their proportionate share of the
victims' damages that were attributable to DES.' 58 Similarly, under
the apportionment formula proposed in this comment, an insurer's
liability would be based on its proportionate share of the total cover-
age. In Sindell, apportioning liability based upon the defendants'
proportionate market shares was the most feasible and equitable so-
lution to allow redress for the claimants' injuries. Although the
Sindell case deals with the liability of manufacturers of a fungible
good, the same basic rationale applies with respect to insurance ap-
portionment in asbestosis cases. Moreover, in California Union In-
surance, a California appellate court has already taken a step to-
wards adopting this apportionment formula for determining insurers'
liability for coverage.' 59 It is, therefore, reasonable to urge the Cali-
fornia courts to adopt the comprehensive apportionment formula as
discussed above. The similarities between the rationales and applica-
157. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
158. Id.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 116-27.
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tions of the proposed apportionment formula and the Sindell and
California Union cases are great enough so that adoption of this
formula is consistent with California legal principles.
V. CONCLUSION
Until one theory of insurance coverage apportionment is applied
to all asbestosis claims, the courts of California and every other state
are free to apply different standards to similar cases. In each state
that has yet to determine the insurance coverage issues in asbestos
litigation, the asbestosis victim has no way of knowing whether his
injury will be redressed. The comprehensive approach discussed
within this comment is the most economically feasible standard for
all of the victims of asbestos litigation -- the insurer, the insured and
the asbestosis victim.
Leslie R. Lopez
